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A META-LOGIC OF INFERENCE RULES: SYNTAX
ALEX CITKIN
Abstract. This work was intended to be an attempt to introduce the
meta-language for working with multiple-conclusion inference rules that
admit asserted propositions along with the rejected propositions. The
presence of rejected propositions, and especially the presence of the rule
of reverse substitution, requires certain change the definition of struc-
turality.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation. The idea of a meta-logic as introduced in the present
paper was triggered by the following observations.
Observation (A). If L is a (propositional) logic and r ∶= Γ/A is a struc-
tural (inference) rule, we say that r is admissible in the logic L if any sub-
stitution that makes all premises from Γ valid in L, makes A valid too. A
logic L is said to be closed under (applications of) rule r if the rule r allows
to derive from L only the formulas from L. It is not hard to see that a rule
r is admissible in L if and only if L is closed under r. If we try to apply
the definition of admissibility to multiple conclusion rules, the equivalence
is not necessarily true. More precisely, a multiple-conclusion rule r ∶= Γ/∆
may be not admissible in L (there is a substitution that makes all premises
valid and all conclusions not valid in L), and yet L is closed under r: there
are the deductive systems having CPL as a set of theorems and containing r
is an inference rule. An example is very simple and somewhat unexpected:
a rule A ∨ B/A,B (the disjunction property) is, certainly, not admissible
in the classical propositional logic (CPL thereafter), and nevertheless, if we
add this rule to the rules of substitution and Modus Ponens, the logic will
remain consistent. Hence, due to CPL being Post complete, the added rule
does not change the logic and, therefore, does not allow us to derive from
CPL any formulas that are not in CPL.
Observation (B). The admissible rules are closely related to the refuta-
tion rules (in the sense of  Lukasiewicz, see e.g. [49, 50]): if a ruleA1, . . . ,An/B
is admissible in a given logic L, the rule ⊣ B/ ⊣ A1, . . . ,⊣ An is a refutation
rule for L. So, in order to be able to study both types of rules at the same
Key words and phrases. propositional logic, multiple-conclusion rule, rejected proposi-
tion,  L-system, admissible rule, deductive system.
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time, we need a proper framework, namely, we need to use the rules con-
taining asserted formulas and rejected formulas. In turn, this will allow us
to extend the notion of admissible rule to this kind of generalized rules.
Observation (C). The use of multiple-conclusion rules in an inference,
which essentially is a proof by cases, requires a better understanding under
which condition we can eliminate a case/alternative. Indeed, in a proof by
cases - if we want to prove a formula A - we first arrive at a complete set
of possible cases/alternatives A1, . . . ,An and then we consider each case Ai
separately trying either to derive A from Ai or to show that the case Ai is
impossible by deriving from Ai some kind of contradiction (semantically or
syntactically). So, when we consider an alternative, we are either trying to
derive a target formula, or to arrive at some kind of contradiction, and the
latter lets us eliminate this alternative. If we deal with a formal proof, we
are not able to employ the semantical means. Thus, in order to demonstrate
a contradiction we are often trying to derive a negation of a formula that was
proven earlier. But in the case when the language does not have a negation
(or a constant for false) it is impossible. The alternative approach is to try
and arrive at a contradiction by syntactically deriving the refutability of a
formula that we already proved. This is another reason why we need to have
the means for proving refutability as a part of our proof system.
If we want to define a logic syntactically we employ a notion of a deduc-
tive system, and we understand this logic as a set of formulas derivable in a
given deductive system. Often, we define inconsistency of a logic, or, more
precisely, inconsistency of a deductive system, as an ability to derive any
formula. Roughly speaking, abolishing the rule that allows to derive every
formula from some form of contradiction allows us to deal with paraconsis-
tent logics.
The suggested approach. Let us assign equal rights to asserted and
rejected propositions1. Let us consider a logic as a pair ⟨L+,L−⟩ of sets
of formulas, where L+ is a set of asserted propositions (theorems) and L−
is a set of rejected propositions (anti-theorems). Thus, at least in theory,
we may have the case when a formula A is asserted and rejected as well
as the case when a formula B is neither asserted, nor rejected. The first
case is related to inconsistency/paraconsistency, while the second case is
related to insufficiency of information. And a logic understood as such a
pair represents, perhaps, better the situation with requests to a database
when the responses to a request can be ambivalent.
If we assign equal rights to the asserted and rejected propositions, it is
natural to include both types of proposition into inference and consider the
inference rules containing asserted propositions as well as rejected proposi-
tions. It means that we define the inference rules not on the sets of formulas,
but rather on the sets of statements like ⊕A - formula A is asserted and ⊖A
1The idea to consider rejected propositions can be traced back as early as 1940-th to
books by R. Carnap (for more historical details and references see Section 2).
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- formula A is rejected. Thus, we derive not a formula, but a statement
about the formula. For instance, Modus Tollens can be represented in the
following way ⊕(A → B),⊖B/ ⊖A (in the  Lukasiewicz’s notation it would
be ⊢ (A → B),⊣ B/ ⊣ A , but we reserve ⊢ for a different use). Let us note
that an ability to derive ⊕A and ⊖A for some formula A, represents some
kind of inconsistency, while an ability to derive ⊕A and ⊕¬A may not lead
to inconsistency, especially if we do not accept a rule ⊕¬A/⊖A.
In order to make our work with statements easier, we construct a meta-
logic. One of the challenges of using multiple-conclusion rules is definition a
notion of inference. In [22, 42] the reader can see how challenging it gets. In
the proposed meta-logic, the inference can be defined as linear: with a rule
Γ/∆ in the meta-logic we associate a statement .Γ→˙ /∆, where ., →˙,/ are
meta-connectives, and we use this statement in an inference as we normally
use a formula (from more details see Section 5).
The differences between single- and multiple-conclusion rules lead to ne-
cessity to clarify such important notions as structurality, inference, closure,
etc. The meta-logic that we are introducing is the first step in this direction.
2. History of the Subject
The idea of including refutation into inference process, as well as the
idea that led to introducing the multiple conclusion rules and logics, came
from the books [4, 5] by Carnap. Then, for quite some time, these two
lines of research were conducted independently by different researchers. Let
us briefly look at the history of the subject and at the motivations that
instigated different researchers.
2.1. R. Carnap.
2.1.1. Refutation. The idea to include refutation into inference process can
be traced back at least to R. Carnap2. Carnap was considering the calculi
together with their interpretations: ”Although the rules of a calculus do
not speak about interpretations, they are nevertheless practically meant in
such a way as to restrict possible interpretations” [4, Paragraph 28]. He
also observed that there are non-normal interpretations. And, according to
Carnap, there are two kinds of non-normal interpretations: the ones that
violate the law of contradiction by admitting a proposition and its negation,
and the ones that violate the law of excluded middle by admitting neither
a proposition, nor its negation is true. In order to exclude the first kind
of non-normal interpretations Carnap suggested to add refutations to the
calculus: ”One new syntactical concept which might be added to those used
in customary calculi is ’C-false’. It is defined on the basis of ’directly C-false’,
which is defined by rules of refutation. By adding a rule of this kind to PC,
the non-normal interpretations of the first kind can be excluded” (see [5,
Paragraph 20]). And he has extended the notion of a calculus in the following
2Some ideas of including refutation into syllogistic were introduced by Aristotle.
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way: ”A syntactical system or calculus K is a system of formal rules. It
consists of a classification of signs, the rules of formation (defining ’sentence
in K’), and the rules of deduction. The rules of deduction usually consist of
primitive sentences and rules of inference (defining ’directly derivable in K’).
Sometimes K also contains rules of refutation (defining ’directly refutable
in K’). If K contains definitions, they may be regarded as additional rules
of deduction”( see [4, Paragraph 24]).
Carnap has also made the following important observation: ”And in
nearly all or perhaps all of the few calculi where rules of refutation are
given, ’directly C-false’ (’directly refutable’) applies only to sentences or
sentential classes from which every sentence is derivable” (see [4, Paragraph
28]). That is, prior to Carnap, a formula would be considered refutable if
adding this formula to axioms leads to inconsistency. As we shall see later
in the Section , in many cases a formula is considered to be refutable, if its
negation is provable.
Carnap rejected such an approach to refutation (when a proposition is re-
futed if its negation is provable) on the grounds that this would not exclude
the non-normal interpretations: think about single-element matrix, for in-
stance (cf. [6]). His approach is different: a proposition is C-false (refutable)
if an anti-axiom (i.e. a proposition accepted as directly refutable) can be
derived from it [4, D28.3]. And he adds a single anti-axiom V (a constant
’False’) to a calculus .
2.1.2. Junctives. In [5] Carnap introduced the notions that later became
known as multiple-conclusion logics (see, for instance, [42]). If adding the
rules of refutation to a calculi solved a problem with non-normal inter-
pretations of the first kind, adding the junctives solves the problem with
non-normal interpretations of the second kind (see [5, Section D]). A con-
junctive is an ordered pair P∧, where P is a finite set of propositions and
P∧ is asserted if every proposition from P, is asserted. A disjunctive is an
ordered pair P∨, where P is a finite set of propositions and P∨ is asserted if
at least one member of P is asserted. Note, that the junctive ∅∧ represents
constant ’true’, while the junctive ∅∨ represents constant ’false’.
A regular (structural) inference rule A1, . . . ,An/B can be regarded as a
rule that allows to derive a disjunctive {B}∨ from a conjunctive {A1, . . . ,An}
∧.
And Carnap suggests to also consider the rules of form A/Q∨ with disjunc-
tive as a consequence. He used such kind of rule and in [5, Section E.26]
where he constructs the calculus PC∗ for the classical propositional logic
and which, besides regular axioms and rules, contains the rule
p ∨ q/{p, q}∨. (1)
He also included a rule for refutation. So, if we consider, for instance, the
Boolean algebras as the models for CPL in the Carnap’s version, the single-
element algebra is not a model due to ⊣ p does not hold in it, and all Boolean
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algebras with more then 2 elements are not the models due to (1) does not
hold in them.
Remark 2.1. The Gentzen’s sequents can be viewed as a multipme-conclusion
constructions. The following quotation from [42] explains why Carnap,
and not Gentzen, perhaps, should be regarded as the one who introduced
multiple-conclusion rules: ”Its germ can be found in Gerhard Gentzen’s
celebrated Untersuchungen u¨ber das logische Schliessen (1934) if one is pre-
pared to interpret his calculus of ’sequents’ as a metatheory for a multiple-
conclusion logic, but this is contrary to Gentzen’s own interpretation, and
it was Rudolf Carnap who first consciously broached the subject in his book
Formalization of logic (1943)” (cf. also the historical note in [42, Section
2.1]).
2.2. J.  Lukasiewicz. In the first edition of his book [27] in 1951 J.  Lukasiewicz
(who, as it appears, was not familiar with Carnap’s research) also included
refutation into calculus for CPL. More precisely, he added to a regular clas-
sical propositional calculus with rules Modus Ponens (MP) and Substitution
(Sb) an anti-axiom ⊣ p, where p is a (propositional) variable, and two rules:
Modus Ponens (MT) and Reverse Substitution (RS)
⊣ σ(A)/ ⊣ A, for every substitution σ and formula A. (RS)
The  Luksiewicz’s motivation was totally different from the Carnap’s. In
his book [27, Preface] J.  Lukasiewicz writes: ”The most important new
results in this part I consider to be the proof of decision, given by my pupil
J. S lupecki, and the idea of rejection introduced by Aristotle and applied
by myself to theory of deduction.” And he added ”Modern formal logic, as
far as I know, does not use ’rejection’ as an operator opposed to Frege’s
’assertion’. The rules of rejection are not yet known”[27, Paragraph 20].
 Lukasiewicz had also observed that for the formal system representing
Aristotle syllogistic it is not enough to use only the rules of reverse sub-
stitution and Modus Tollens for refutation. He wrote [27, p. 75] ”A new
rule of rejection must be added to the system to complete the insufficient
characterization of the Aristotelian logic given by the four axioms. This rule
was found by J. S lupecki.”(for more about S lupecki rules see [48, 26])
In [28]  Lukasiewicz suggested that adding ⊣ p , RS, MT, ⊣ A,⊣ B/ ⊣
(A ∨ B) to the regular axioms and rules of IPC would give the complete
refutation system for IPL. He also did not identify rejection with negation.
Specifically in [28], he wrote that ”In my recently published work on Aris-
totle’s Syllogistic I gave reasons for introducing ”rejection” into classical
theory of deduction as a complement of assertion”.
Thus, the  Lukasiewicz’s motivations were (a) to be able to contract a
formal system for syllogistic, (b) to have a counterpart for the asserted
proposition, (c) to have decidability as a result of axiomatization.
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2.3. D. Scott. It turned out that the axiomatization suggested by  Lukasiewicz
for IPL is not complete. This gap was filled by D. Scott. In [37] he con-
sidered →,⊺,-fragment of IPC. A refutation part of his calculus contains
an anti-axiom ⊣ , the rules MT and RS, and some additional (rather com-
plex) rules. The complete axiomatization for IPL that includes refutation
was constructed much later by T. Skura [43].
The goal of [37] (besides fixing the shortcomings of  Lukasiewicz’s conjec-
ture) was ”by use of refutation rules to enumerate the unprovable formulae
in much the same way in which we enumerate the theorems, every formula
being either provable or refutable. The sets of valid and invalid formulae are
closed under the rules. Hence, no formula is both provable and refutable,
the calculus is decidable, and a formula is provable if and only if it is valid.”
Thus, the motivation here is to construct a calculus that gives decidability
and semantical completeness.
Later, in early 1970-th, D. Scott introduced the multiple-conclusion con-
sequence relations (see e.g.[38, 41]). Nevertheless, he did not include in these
relations the rejected propositions.
2.4. Refutation: Further development. The axiomatic systems that in-
clude refutation can be roughly divided in three types: dual, complementary
and mixed.
2.4.1. Dual Systems. A dual system is a system that allows to derive rejected
propositions from rejected like we derive asserted propositions from asserted.
Similarly to regular logical systems, these systems can be constructed in a
form of a closure operator (e.g. [58]). This kind of system have found
applications in the computer science and artificial intelligence (e.g. [56]).
2.4.2. Complementary (Symmetric) Systems. The complementary systems
contain, essentially, two subsystems: one for deriving the asserted propo-
sitions, and another - for deriving the rejected propositions. For instance,
in [49, 50, 59] the authors consider two closure operators: the regular one
Cn that gives the theorems, and the complementary one Cn−, that gives
anti-theorems (see also [45, Section 5.2]).
2.4.3. Mixed Systems. In these systems the asserted propositions are derived
from the asserted propositions, while the rejected propositions are derived
from the rejected and, asserted propositions (think about Modus Tollens,
for instance). The system suggested by  Lukasiewicz for CPL is, of course,
of this type. It is the most common type of the refutation systems. The
complete (mixed) systems were constructed for various of logics (see, for
instance [9, 3, 57, 11, 1, 44, 52, 2]).
2.4.4. Direct and Indirect Refutation. R. Carnap and J.  Lukasiewicz viewed
the derivation of a rejection in different ways.
R. Carnap suggested that we can use the regular notion of derivation (that
allows to derive a formula (proposition) from a set of formulas (propositions),
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and that we reject a formula A if we can derive from A a formula that we
know is rejected, is an anti-axiom. Roughly speaking, if A ⊢ B and B
is rejected, we reject A. We call this approach indirect and we call the
refutation systems based on this approach C-system3. For instance, if we
add to CPC (with rules Modus Ponens and Substitution) an anti-axiom ⊣ p
(where p is a propositional variable), then, in this extended calculus, we are
able to reject every classically invalid formula, for p is derivable in CPC from
every class classically invalid formula.
J.  Lukasiewicz, on the other hand, suggested that the rejected formulas
should be derived from the asserted and rejected formulas by means of reg-
ular inference rules (Modus Ponens and Substitution), and by means of ad-
ditional inference rules that allow to derive the rejected formulas, such rules
as Modus Tollens and Reverse Substitution. We call this type of refutation
systems direct or  L-systems. For instance, in order to obtain an  L-system for
the classical logic,  Lukasiewicz adds to CPC the same anti-axiom ⊣ p, but
he endows CPC with two new inference rules: Modus Tollens abd Reverse
Substitution.
If we consider only rules Modus Ponens, Substitution, Modus Tollens
and Reverse Substitution, not every C-derivation can be converted into  L-
derivation, and not every C-system can be converted into  L-system. In [54]
Staszek establishes the conditions under which a C-system can be converted
into  L-system. Generally speaking, if a propositional language contains im-
plication → and a formula p → (q → p) is derivable, then any C-system can
be converted into  L-system. For instance, for all intermediate or normal
modal logics every C-system can be converted into  L-system. If we con-
sider the multiple-conclusion rules with rejected propositions, all C-system
become ”convertible” into  L-systems, and this is an additional reason to use
such type rules.
The following example shows the difference between C- and  L-derivations
of refutability of ¬p in CPC with rules Modus Ponens (MP) and Substitution
(Sb) endowed with an anti-axiom ⊣ p and rules Modus Tollens (MT) and
Reverse Substitution (RS).
Table 1. Example of C- and  L-derivation
C-derivation  L-derivation
1 ¬p premiss ⊣ p anti-axiom
2 ¬(p→ p) from 1 by Sb ⊢ ¬(p→ p)→ p derivable in CPC
3 ¬(p→ p)→ p derivable in CPC ⊣ ¬(p→ p) from 1, 2 by MT
4 p by MP from 2, 3 ⊣ ¬p from 3 by RS
5 ¬p is refuted anti-axiom is de-
rived from ¬p
3In [54] indirect derivations are called i-derivations.
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2.5. Multiple-conclusion rules: Further development. As we men-
tioned above in the Section 2.1.2, the concept of multiple-conclusion rule
was introduced by R. Carnap in [5], where R. Carnap studied a notion of
junctives and rules dealing with junctives. This concept has been developed
further by W. Kneale [22] (some corrections are in [23]) where multiple-
conclusion proof was defined. This definition was refined in the 1970-th in
the papers by D. Shoesmith and T. Smiley and summarized in their book
[42]. At the about the same time multiple-conclusion relations were studied
by D. Scott [38, 39, 40, 41]. Let us note that even though D. Scott considers
the relation Γ ⊢∆ where Γ,∆ are finite sets of formulas, he does not regard
an expression Γ ⊢ ∆ for given finite sets of formulas Γ,∆ as an instance
of an inference rule: D. Scott views such an expression as a ”conditional
statement” and investigates the means that allow to derive a conditional
statement from the set of conditional statements (for more details we refer
the reader to [41].)
In 1999 M. Kracht in his review [24] suggested to study the admissibility
of multiple-conclusion rules, and such a study was carried out, for instance,
in [18, 19]. Let us also remark that in [25] M. Kracht arrives to a notion of
a consequence relation in some respects similar the one introduced in this
paper.
2.6. What This Paper is About. In his 1996 paper [51] T. Smiley out-
lined an approach to combining multiple-conclusion rules with refutability.
We are taking a similar approach. We will discuss the similarities and differ-
ences later in Section 6. The discussion of philosophical aspects of Smiley’s
paper can be found in [20, 30, 16].
In this paper we introduce a metalanguage that gives us the formal syn-
tactic means for working with inference rules (rules thereafter) admitting
simultaneously asserted and rejected formulas. In Section 3 we extend the
notion of consequence relation to sets of asserted and rejected propositions
(formulas). Then, in the Section 4, we define a logics as an ordered pair of a
set of asserted and a set of rejected propositions and we introduce the conse-
quence relations and logics that admit rejected propositions independently
from asserted propositions, meaning that not asserted proposition does not
have to be rejected and vice versa. Then, in the same section, we construct
the meta-language and we define inference (derivation). In Section 5 we will
see how a logic understood as a pair can be defined by a deductive system.
In the present paper we will not discuss the semantic of such systems.
Let us note that the presence of rejected formulas requires some clar-
ification of how an inference rule is understood. The difference becomes
apparent if we compare Modus Ponens in form A,A → B/B and Modus Tol-
lens ⊣ B,⊢ A → B/ ⊢ A: we cannot write out Modus Tollens without using
turnstile and reverse turnstile: if we include the refuted propositions (for-
mulas) into rules, for every premise or conclusion we must indicate whether
this proposition is assumed to be asserted or rejected. Let us recall that in
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[41] D. Scott considers the following possible forms of Modus Ponens
Four forms of Modus Ponens
A,A → B ⊢ B ⊢ A → B ⊢ A ⊢ A
A ⊢ B ⊢ A→ B A ⊢ B
⊢ B ⊢ B
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Table 1
And he argues that the rule (iii) deserves the name ’Modus Ponens’, for ”this
is methatheoretic statement that the validities of the system are closed under
the rule allowing for the detachment of the conclusion of the implication
(provided it and its antecedent are valid).” And Scott continues: (i) is a
conditional tautology that suggests the rule (iii). Also, he is pointing out
that in the  Lukasiewicz many-valued logic (i) fails, while (ii),(iii) and (iv)
hold. Thus, the rules (i) and (iii) are different.
It is important to keep in mind that throughout the paper the rules are
understood in form (iii).
The following peculiarity of the derivation systems that admit derivations
of asserted propositions from rejected ones is worth mentioning. In the
regular deductive systems we can eliminate the rule of Substitution by using
axiom schemata instead of axioms. This elimination is possible, because, for
example, a derivation like
⊢ A,⊢ (A → B),⊢ B,⊢ σ(B),
where A,B are formulas and σ is a substitution, can be reduced to
⊢ σ(A),⊢ (σ(A) → σ(B)),⊢ σ(B)
and σ(A) and σ(A)→ σ(B) are derivable. The situation changes if we admit
the rules containing the rejected propositions as premises and the asserted
propositions as conclusions. For example, if we admit the rule
⊣ A,⊢ A ∨B/ ⊢ B, (2)
the following derivation cannot be reduced like a previous one, even though
the rule (2) is structural:
⊣ A,⊢ A ∨B,⊢ B,⊢ σ(B),
because ⊣ σ(A) may be not derivable. So, we can use the schemata, for
instance, in order to define the set of axioms, but we cannot eliminated the
rule of Substitution from the deductive system (likewise, we cannot eliminate
the rule of Reverse Substitution).
2.7. What This Paper is Not About. There are several very impor-
tant topics of logic and philosophy of logic that are closely related to the
proposed approach. Yet, we will not discuss them, because each of these
topics deserves a separate consideration. We will be focusing on studying
the meta-logic for rules, and we will not be touching the following topics
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(that we mention here only in order to underscore their relations to the
introduced meta-logic). So, we will not discuss in this paper:
● The relations between rejection and negation (see, e.g. [51, 33, 34,
10, 32, 35]). In particular, between ¬A and cases when ⊣ σ(A) is
valid for every substitution σ (the reader can consider the formula
◇p ∧ ¬◇ p, each substitution instance of which is rejected in S4.)
● The role and meaning of logical constants (see, e.g. [31, 34, 8, 7]).
● The applications to paraconsistent logics (see, e.g. [55]). We just
note that there is a big difference between situation when ⊢ A and
⊢ ¬A are permissible (paraconsistency) and the situation when ⊢ A
and ⊣ A are permissible (we call this incoherency or ambivalence).
● The philosophical aspects of multiple-conclusion inference (see, e.g.
[32, 35]).
● The hypersequent proof systems for rules ( see, e.g. [15, 14]) .
● The tableaux methods (see, e.g. [17, 12]).
● The refutation systems for particular logics (see e.g. [11, 44, 53, 46,
47]).
3. Consequence Relations
In this section we introduce the consequence relations that include simul-
taneously rejected and asserted propositions. But first and foremost we need
to introduce some notions and notation.
3.1. Language. Let Fm be a set of propositional formulas built in a regular
way from a countable set of (propositional) variables P and the finite set of
(finitely-ary) connectives f1, . . . , fn (not containing signs .,/, →˙,∸,⊤,⊥,⊕,⊖
that we reserve for use in the meta-language). For propositional variables
we will use letters p, q, r, s may be with indexes. To denote the propositional
formulas we will use the capital Roman letters (sometimes with indexes)
from the beginning of alphabet, while the capital Roman letters (sometimes
with indexes) from the end of the alphabet will be used as meta-variables
that can be substituted with propositional formulas. For instance, X → Y ∧Z
is a schemata, while A → B ∧ C, where A ∶= p, B ∶= q1 ∨ q2, C ∶= ¬r, is a
formula.
With each propositional variable p ∈ P, we associate a formula variable
Xp ranging over Fm. For instance, A(p1, . . . , pn) is a formula on n vari-
ables, while A(Xp1 , . . . ,Xpn) is a schemata. We will use tilde for denoting
schemata, i.e. A˜ is a schemata obtained from a formula A by replacing
the propositional variables with corresponding formula variables. Roughly
speaking, a schemata is a formula to which we allow to apply substitution.
A formulasA(B1, . . . ,Bn), obtained from a schemata A˜ ∶= A(Xp1 , . . . ,Xpn)
(or from a formula A for this matter), by substituting formulas for formula
variables, is a substitution instance of A˜ (instance, for short).
As usual, a substitution is a mapping σ ∶ P → Fm and by σ(A) we denote
a result of simultaneous substitution in A of σ(p) for p for every variable
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occurring in A. If Γ is a set of formulas and σ is a substitution by σ(Γ) we
denote {σ(A) ∣ A ∈ Γ}. The set of all substitutions will be denoted by Σ.
Given a set of formulas Γ and a substitution σ, we say that the set Γ is
closed under substitutions, if σ(Γ) ⊆ Γ, and we say that Γ is closed under
reverse substitutions, if Γ ⊆ σ(Γ). It is not hard to see that Γ is closed under
substitutions if and only if its complement Fm ∖ Γ is closed under reverse
substitutions.
3.2. Meta-Language: Atomic Statements. In order to include the re-
jected propositions into logic, we need to be able, given a formula A, to
distinguish whether A is asserted or rejected. To achieve this, we use meta-
language in which we we can express assertion and rejection. In this section
we introduce the metalanguage.
We start with a notions of statement and schema-statement.
Definition 3.1. If A ∈ Fm is a formula then the expressions ⊕A and ⊖A
we call atomic statements. ⊕A is a positive atomic statement and ⊕A is a
negative atomic statement. A is called a propositional part of ⊕A or ⊖A.
By ⊙A we denote an atomic statement with propositional part A, that is
⊙A can be ⊕A or ⊖A. And by ⊙A we denote an atomic statement of the
”opposite sign”, that is ⊙A is ⊕A, if ⊙A is ⊖A, and ⊙A is ⊖A, if ⊙A is ⊕A.
By Sa w denote the set of all atomic statements. S
+
a and S
−
a are re-
spectively the sets of all positive and negative atomic statements. Thus,
Sa = S
+
a ∪ S
−
a and S
+
a ∩ S
−
a = ∅.
Remark 3.1 (about denotation). J.  Lukasiewicz is using for this purpose
⊢ A and ⊣ A, but we reserve the sign ⊢ for consequence relations. In [51]
T. Smiley is using the sign ∗ to denote that a proposition is rejected, that is,
∗A denotes ’A is rejected’. In [13] L. Humberstone is using [+]A and [−]A
and calls ’a signed formula’ what we call ’an atomic statement’.
3.3. Consequence Relation. In this section, we extend the notion of con-
sequence relation (e.g. [40]) from sets of formulas to sets of atomic state-
ments. We will use the customary conventions: if Γ,∆ ⊆ Sa, then Γ,∆
denotes Γ ∪∆ and, if α ∈ Sa, then Γ, α denotes Γ ∪ {α}.
Definition 3.2. A consequence relation is a binary relation on the class
F(Sa) of all finite sets of statements that satisfies the following conditions:
(R) if Γ ∩∆ ≠ ∅, then Γ ⊢∆
(M) if Γ ⊢∆, then Γ,Γ1 ⊢∆,∆1
(T) if Γ,⊙A ⊢∆ and Γ ⊢ ⊙A,∆, then Γ ⊢∆,
where Γ,Γ1,∆,∆1 are finite sets of atomic statements, ⊙A is an atomic
statement.
Next, we want to define a notion of structural consequence relation, but
the regular definition cannot be used for the following reason: the substitu-
tions into negative statements can lead to unwanted results: if ⊢ ⊖p and we
allow to substitute any formula for p, we will reject every formula.
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Definition 3.3. A consequence relation ⊢ is called structural if for every
σ ∈ Σ
Γ ⊢∆ entails σ(Γ) ⊢ σ(∆) for every Γ,∆ ⊆ S+a and
σ(Γ) ⊢ σ(∆) entails Γ ⊢∆ for every Γ,∆ ⊆ S−a .
It is not hard to see that a meet of structural consequence relations is
a structural consequence relation. Hence, for any given set of pairs S ∶=
{Γi/∆i, i ∈ I}, where Γi,∆i ⊆ Sa, there is a smallest consequence relation ⊢S
such that Γi ⊢S ∆i for all i ∈ I. We will say that the relation ⊢S is defined
by S.
From this point forward we consider only structural consequence relations.
The class of all structural consequence relations is denoted by Fm⊢. It is
easy to see that an arbitrary meet of consequence relations is a consequence
relation. Hence, Fm⊢ forms a complete lattice relative to set meet and closed
joins, and ⊢ defines on Fm a closure operator (cf. [40, Proposition 1.1.]).
Thus, every set K ∶= {Γi/∆i}, where Γi,∆i ⊆ FSa, i ∈ I, defines a consequence
relation ⊢K - the smallest consequence relation such that Γi ⊢∆i, for all i ∈ I.
4. Logics
In this section we introduce the notion of logic that admits the rejected
formulas.
Definition 4.1. Logic is an ordered pair of sets of formulas L = ⟨L+,L−⟩,
where L+ is closed under substitutions and L− is closed under reverse substi-
tutions. L+ is a positive or an asserted part of L , or a set of the theorems
of L . L− is a negative or a rejected part of L , or a set of anti-theorem of
L .
Given a logic L , by L + and L − we respectively denote a positive and a
negative parts of L .
Every consequence relation ⊢ defines a logic L⊢ ∶= ⟨L
+,L−⟩, where
L
+ = {A ∣ A ∈ Fm,⊢ ⊕A} and L− = {A ∣ A ∈ Fm,⊢ ⊖A}. (3)
Definition 4.2. We use the following terminology: a logic L is
coherent : L + ∩L − = ∅
full : L + ∪L − = Fm
standard : full and coherent
trivial : L + = L − = Fm
degenerate : L + = L − = ∅
Proposition 4.1. Every logic L can be defined by a consequence relation.
Proof. Indeed, given a logic L = ⟨L+,L−⟩, one can consider the following
consequence relation: for every finite Γ,∆ ⊆ Fm
Γ ⊢∆ if and only if ∆ ∩ (Γ ∪ {⊕A ∣ A ∈ L+} ∪ {⊖A ∣ A ∈ L−}) ≠ ∅, (4)
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that is, we take a trivial consequence relation Γ ⊢ ∆ ⇋ Γ ∩∆ ≠ ∅ and add
as axioms atomic statements obtained form the formulas of L . It is not
hard to see that A ∈ L+ (or A ∈ L−) if and only if ⊢ ⊕A (or, respectively,
⊢ ⊖A). 
Any given consequence relation uniquely defines a logic, while the con-
verse is not necessarily true: a given logic L may be defined by distinct
consequence relations (see Section 6 for examples). So, we can consider a
class
⊢L ∶= {⊢∈ Fm
⊢ ∣ L = L⊢}.
It is clear that ⊢L is closed under set meet. Hence, ⊢L has a smallest
(relative to set inclusion) element, namely the relation defined by (4). An
example of a logic L such that ⊢L is not closed under closed joins
4
In presence of multiple-conclusion rules to define how a formula can be
derived from a set of formulas may be somewhat complex (see e.g. [42]).
In order to simplify it, in the following Section we will extend the meta-
language endowing it with meta-connectives.
4.1. Meta-Language: Statements. In this section, we enrich the meta-
language by introducing statements that play a central role in our research.
First, we introduce the meta-connectives .,/, →˙,∸,⊤⊥ and we define a
notion of statement.
Definition 4.3. Atomic statement is statement. ⊤,⊥ are statements. If
α,β are statements then α.β,α/β,α→˙β,∸α are statements. The set of all
statements we denote by S.
We will also use tilde to denote schemata statements: α˜ denotes the
schemata statement obtained from a given statement α by replacing all
formulas with schemata. A substitution instance (instance, for short) of a
given schemata statement α˜ is a statement obtained from α˜ by simultaneous
substitution of formula variables with formulas.
Let us observe that statements of type ⊕A1.. . ..⊕An and ⊕A1/. . ./⊕An
are Carnap’s junctives (cf. [5, Section D, $21]), the former being a conjunc-
tive and the latter being a disjunctive. Also, the schemata statements of
form ⊕A˜1 . . . . . ⊕A˜n→˙ ⊕ B˜1 / . . . / ⊕B˜m represent the multiple-conclusion
rules (comp. [42, Section 2.3]).
Next, we introduce the notions of positive and negative statements.
Definition 4.4. A statement that has no occurrences of  and negative
atomic statements is positive. A statement that has no occurrences of ⊺ and
positive atomic statements is negative. If Γ is a set of statements, by Γ+ and
Γ− we denote the subsets (may be empty) of all positive or, respectively,
negative members of Γ.
4As an example one can consider two calculi defining a logic of 7-element single-
generated Heyting algebra: one containing the rule (¬¬p → p) → (p ∨ ¬p)/(¬¬p ∨ ¬p),
and another – containing the rule p ∨ q/p, q.
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For instance, ⊕A→˙⊕B is a positive statement; ⊖B is a negative statement;
a statement (⊕A→˙ ⊕B) ∧⊖B is neither positive, nor negative.
If σ ∈ Σ is a substitution, we extend the scope of σ from propositional
formulas to statements by induction in the following way:
σ(⊺) ∶= ⊺, σ() ∶= 
σ(⊙A) ∶= ⊙σ(A) for every A ∈ Fm
σ(α ○ β) ∶= σ(α) ○ σ(β) ○ ∈ {.,/, →˙} and for all α,β ∈ S
σ(∸α) ∶= ∸σ(α) for all α ∈ S
In other words, given a statement α, σ(α) is obtained from α by replacing
every occurrence of statement ⊙A with ⊙σ(A).
5. Deductive System and Inference
In this section, we extend the notions of deductive system and inference
that accommodate the rejected propositions.
Definition 5.1. A deductive system is an ordered pair ⟨Ax ;R⟩, where Ax ⊆ S
is a set of axiom statements (axioms for short) and R is a set of statement
schemata that we call rules. The deductive system S0 ∶= ⟨∅;∅⟩ we call a
zero-system.
We consider the following three meta-inference rules
for every α,β ∈ S, from α→˙β and α infer β (MMP )
for every α ∈ S+ and σ ∈ Σ, from α infer σ(α) (Sb)
for every α ∈ S− and σ ∈ Σ, from σ(α) infer α (RS)
If Γ is a set of statements and σ is a substitution, we let σ(Γ) ∶= {σ(α) ∣
α ∈ Γ}. That is, σ(Γ) is a set of σ-substitutions in each member of Γ. Given
a set of statements Γ, we say that Γ is closed under substitutions (under Sb,
for short), if σ(Γ) ⊆ Γ for every σ ∈ Σ. And we say that Γ is closed under
reverse substitutions, if Γ ⊂ σ(Γ) for every σ ∈ Σ.
The statements, obtained from the axioms of the classical propositional
calculus (CPC) (e.g. the axioms of [21, Group A1]) by substituting the
propositional variables with statements, are called meta-axioms. If α is a
statement, then the statements
(⊺→˙α)→˙α (Ax⊺)
→˙α (Ax)
are meta-axioms.
Now, we can use a regular definition of a (Hilbert style) inference.
Definition 5.2. Let S ∶= ⟨Ax ,R⟩ be a deductive system, Γ be a set of
statements and α be a statement. A sequence of statements α1, . . . , αn is
an inference (a derivation) of α from Γ over S, if αn is α and for every
1 ≤ i ≤ none of the following hold
(a) αi is a meta-axiom
(b) αi is an axiom of S
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(c) αi is an instance a rule of S
(d) αi obtained by (Sb) or (RS) from some αj , where j < i
(e) αi obtained by (MMP) from some αj , αk, where j, k < i.
If there exists an inference of α from Γ over S, we write Γ ⊢S α and we
say that α is derivable from Γ over S. If S is a zero-system, we will omit the
reference to S and we say that α is derivable from Γ. It is easy to see that
Γ ⊢ α if there is a sequence of statements α1, . . . , αn such that α = αn and
each αi is either meta-axiom, or obtained from the preceding statements by
(Sb),(Rs) or (MMP).
Obviously, every deductive system S defines a consequence relation Γ ⊢S α
on the finite sets of statements and statements. In its own turn, the con-
sequence relation ⊢S induces a consequence relation on finite sets of atomic
statements: for all A1, . . . ,An,B1, . . . ,Bn ∈ Fm
A1, . . . ,An ⊢S B1, . . . ,Bn if and only if ⊢S A1 . . . . .An→˙B1 / . . . /Bn (5)
and defines a logic LS:
L
+
S ∶= {⊕A ∣⊢S ⊕A,A ∈ Fm} and L
−
S ∶= {⊖A ∣⊢S ⊖A,A ∈ Fm}. (6)
It is not hard to see that the converse is also true: any logic can be defined
by some deductive system (which is not necessarily unique).
Definition 5.3. We say that a deductive system is full, coherent, standard
or trivial if the logic, defined by this system, is respectively full, coherent,
standard or trivial.
Let us consider an example.
Example 1. The  Lukasiewicz’s refutation system for the classical logic (in
the signature {→,¬}) can be defined by the deductive system ⟨Ax ,R⟩, con-
sisting of the following four axioms and two rules:
⊕((p → q)→ ((q → r)→ (p→ r))) axiom (axiom of CPC)
⊕((¬p→ p)→ p) axiom (axiom of CPC)
⊕(p→ (¬p→ q)) axiom (axiom of CPC)
⊖p axiom ( Lukasiwicz’s anti-axiom)
(⊕X .⊕(X → Y ))→˙ ⊕ Y rule (Modus Ponens)
(⊖Y . ⊕(X → Y ))→˙ ⊖X rule (Modus Tollens)
Let us note, that we did not include into our deductive system the rules
of substitution and reverse substitution used by  Lukasiewicz, because they
are already included into the definition of inference.
Let us observe, that (MMP) with the meta-axiom x→˙(y→˙(x . y)) allows
to apply the inner rules, that is, the inference rules specific for a given logics,
like Modus Ponens, for instance. Indeed, suppose we derived the statements
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⊕A and ⊕(A → B). Then,
1. ⊕A was derived
2. ⊕(A→ B) was derived
3. ⊕A→˙(⊕(A → B)→˙(⊕A . ⊕(A → B))) a substitution instance of
x→˙(y→˙(x . y))
4. ⊕A .⊕(A → B) from 1,2 and 3 by (MMP)
5. (⊕A . ⊕(A→ B))→˙ ⊕B an instance of Modus Ponens
6. ⊕B from 4 and 5 by (MMP)
As usual, two statements α and β are equivalent if ⊢ α→˙β and ⊢ β→˙α.
Proposition 5.1. Every statement α is equivalent to a meta-conjuction of
the statements of form ⊙A1 . . . . . ⊙An→˙ ⊙B1 / . . . /⊙Bm.
Proof. In the classical logic, every formula is equivalent to a formula in
conjunctive normal form. Hence, every statement α is equivalent to a meta-
conjunction of statements, each of which has the following form
∸ ⊙A1 / . . . / ∸⊙An / ⊙B1 / . . . /⊙Bm. (7)
It is clear that(7) is equivalent to
∸ (⊙A1 . . . . . ⊙An) /⊙B1 / . . . /⊙Bm (8)
and (8) is equivalent to
(⊙A1 . . . . .⊙An)→˙ ⊙B1 / . . . / ⊙Bm.

From the Proposition 5.1, it follows that α is equivalent to a meta-
conjunction of rules for any given deductive system S as long as for every
σ ∈ Σ,⊢S σ(α).
6. Concluding Remarks
As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, in [51] T. Smiley has intro-
duced a calculus for CPC contains rules for rejection proposition. Among
these rules he uses the following5
⊖A ⊢ ⊕¬A (r1)
⊕¬A ⊢ ⊖A (r2)
(9)
Let us observe that the above rules yield that ⊢ ⊖A entails that for every
substitution σ ∈ Σ,⊢ ⊖σ(A), i.e. substitutions preserve validity of rejection.
Indeed, from ⊢ ⊖A and the rule (r1) we infer ⊢ ⊕¬A. Since ⊕¬A is an
assertion, for every substitution σ ∈ Σ we have ⊢ ¬σ(A) and, using rule (r2),
we get ⊢ ⊖σ(A). Thus, the  Lukasiewicz’s axiom for rejection ⊖p, where p is
a propositional variable, is not valid in the Smiley’s logic: ⊢ ⊖p yields ⊖A
for every formula A, while Smiley’s logic is not trivial. In other words, the
5We are using the notation from the present paper.
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Smiley’s logic does not admit the rule of reverse substitution. So, in the
Smiley’s logic the formula p is neither asserted, nor rejected.
Let us remark that the above considerations can be applied to every logic
in which rejection of a formula is equal to assertion of negation of this
formula.
Let us also note that the use of multiple-conclusion rules gives us an ability
to construct distinct consequence relations defining standard classical propo-
sitional logic. Indeed, one can add the rule p ∨ q/p, q to the  Lukasiewicz’s
calculus and the obtained calculus will still define the classical logic. In
fact, there is infinite set of distinct consequence relations defining the clas-
sical logic: for every k > 1 we can add to the  Lukasiewicz’s calculus the
rule
Rk ∶= ⊺/{(pi ↔ pj), i ≠ j,1 ≤ i, j ≤ 2
k}.
It is not hard to see that the rule Rk is valid in a Boolean algebra with
2k elements, but is not valid in any Boolean algebra with more than 2k
elements. Thus, the calculi obtained from the  Lukasiewicz’s calculus by
adding the rules Rk are distinct and non-trivial.
In conclusion, we note that the presence of the rule of reverse substitution
makes semantic of such logics much more complex and calls for the use of
matrices similar to Q-matrices introduced by G. Malinowski (see, e.g. [29]).
We will discuss the semantic for the logic with rejection in a separate paper.
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